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Introduction 
 
When a particular discourse essentially revolves around something one believes not 
to exist, one will likely be an error theorist about this discourse. If the putative properties or 
objects of reference fail to be instantiated or to exist, the propositions expressed by the 
discourse will be systematically false. Hence, most people are error theorists about Santa 
Claus discourse1, unicorn discourse and witchcraft discourse. If Santa has no place in one’s 
critically considered ontology, then propositions such as “Santa has a big white beard and a 
red suit” will be false, despite being commonly uttered and accepted without debate. Thus, 
what motivates an error theory about a particular discourse is that something which that 
discourse requires in order to successfully refer is, in fact, not present in the world. 
Richard Joyce (2001) argues that moral discourse warrants an error theory. Following 
John Mackie (1977), Joyce understands moral discourse as truth-apt, and intending to refer 
to objectively prescriptive values. Thus, unless we can discover what such values are like, 
and that they exist in the world, moral propositions are systematically false. Joyce argues 
that an objective moral prescription implies that there are some actions for which a valid 
imperative2 could be directed at any agent. Thus, in order for a moral assertion to be true, 
there must be some action for which a ‘real’ reason can be given to any individual to comply. 
The task of Chapter One is to explore the competing conceptions of what it takes for an 
agent to have a real reason, and to consider whether any of these could underwrite a 
universally valid imperative. I find that real reasons are necessarily rooted in the desires of 
the agent, and that these desires are divergent enough to ensure that no imperative is 
universally valid. Thus the error theory is entailed if one holds an objectively prescriptive 
conception of moral discourse. 
                                                          
1
 While there is room for a non-cognitivist analysis of Santa Claus discourse, or perhaps to suppose 
that Santa Claus does exist, but is an abstract object that comes into existence as a result of the Santa 
fiction, there is a good case to be made for an error theory. 
2
 Joyce writes that “Mackie uses the word “valid” *...+, I think, as a quality that stands to imperatives 
as truth stands to propositions.” (2011:3, footnote 4). 
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Chapter Two investigates a response by Stephen Finlay (2008), who argues that moral 
assertions are not intended to refer to objectively prescriptive values, but instead to the 
standards and ends of the speaker. Thus, a moral imperative is valid if the prescribed action 
facilitates the realisation of the speaker’s ends, and many moral assertions are true. Hence, 
Finlay’s relational understanding of moral discourse escapes the threat of error theory. 
However, there remains controversy about whether this is a legitimate way to understand 
moral concepts. Indeed, Joyce (2011) insists that objectively prescriptive values are a 
necessary feature of our moral concepts. I analyse Finlay’s re-interpretation of the 
behaviours surrounding moral discourse in the light of his theory, finding his explanation less 
coherent than one which assumes objectivity, but plausible nonetheless. 
Finally, I evaluate whether Finlay’s relational moral discourse can pragmatically ‘pull 
its weight’ and perform the same functions as the objectively prescriptive moral discourse. I 
find that relational moral imperatives often fail to provide authoritative reasons for action to 
the person being addressed. However, I see no principled way of deciding whether such use 
is a non-negotiable element of moral discourse. Thus, I conclude that this dispute remains 
underdetermined: what to make of it depends upon one’s intuitions about the requisite 
strength of moral imperatives.  
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Chapter One: Objective Prescriptivity and Error 
 
 
1.0 Introduction: Mackie 
John Mackie’s (1977) seminal book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong challenged 
users of moral discourse to review precisely what such discourse entails. He further 
questioned whether belief in moral properties is compatible with the way the rest of the 
world is construed; whether it has a place in a critically considered analysis of the world. 
Mackie denied a non-cognitive analysis of moral discourse, believing moral claims to be 
assertoric and truth-apt. However, Mackie also denied the realist thesis that there are moral 
claims that are true3. This is because moral claims imply the existence of values that are 
'objectively prescriptive' and such entities are not to be found. Thus, he concluded that 
whilst moral claims 'aim' at truth, they are in reality systematically false. Hence, moral 
discourse is hopelessly committed to asserting claims that, by their nature, necessarily fail to 
refer. This chapter will examine the nature of objective prescriptivity (following in the 
footsteps of Richard Joyce’s 2001 book, The Myth of Morality) and evaluate whether moral 
discourse, if committed to this thesis, is indeed fundamentally flawed. The following chapter 
will re-evaluate whether objective prescriptivity is a necessary feature of moral discourse (in 
the light of a 2008 paper by Stephen Finlay) and thus whether there is a call for a moral error 
theory. 
 
1.1 Imperatives and Institutions: Kant and Foot 
Imagine a murderer whose guilt is not in question. Furthermore, imagine that this 
murderer believes he has done as he should in every dimension of the act and is entirely 
                                                          
3
 Specifically, claims of moral requirement (e.g., you morally ought Ø) are never true. However, the 
denial of such a claim (it is false that you morally ought Ø) is always true, if vacuously so. Thus, as 
helpfully observed by Joyce (2001) it is only atomic moral claims that are necessarily false. 
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unrepentant. This is not merely a case where the murderer stands to gain something from 
his action which outweighs whatever loss he suffers: this is an unusual circumstance in 
which every outcome appears to satisfy his desires. Perhaps he hated his victim and 
everybody who cares about him. Perhaps he gains a special, guilt-free thrill from killing. 
Perhaps he wanted to be caught, even punished. Such a case is highly unusual, but surely 
not impossible. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a consequent not desired by the 
murderer, the moral injunction that he ought not to have killed his victim remains steadfast. 
No matter how poorly he judges it would have served his desires, morally speaking he still 
ought to have refrained. To give some credence to this story and agree that the moral 
imperative not to kill would apply to such an agent is to admit that moral imperatives apply 
to agents regardless of their subjective desires and ends; moral judgements are objective. 
This chapter argues that despite the purported desire-transcendence of moral imperatives, 
all valid imperatives provide reasons for action, and real reasons for action are those 
somehow rooted in desires4. Thus, to vindicate moral discourse it must be established that, 
on some level, the unrepentant murderer is frustrating his own desires. 
The insistence that moral requirements are imposed upon agents regardless of their 
desires can be traced back to Kant’s explication of the categorically imperative nature of 
morality. Thus, to understand what it means for morality to be objective in this way it is 
useful to discuss the nature of hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical 
imperatives are those which ought to be done in order to attain satisfaction of an agent’s 
desires. In Kant’s words, “if the action would be good merely as a means to something else 
the imperative is hypothetical” (1785/1997: 4:414). For example, “If you want to feel better 
then you should see a doctor this afternoon” is a hypothetical imperative. As such, a 
hypothetical imperative functions as practical advice in order to achieve a goal. However, if 
                                                          
4
 This claim omits the possibility of externalism about reasons, which shall be dealt with in 1.3. 
Furthermore, there are various ways to understand the connection between desires and reasons. 
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our agent suddenly rallies and is feeling fine, the applicability of the hypothetical imperative 
to go see the doctor dissolves, or ‘evaporates’, as the reason to comply is no longer present. 
Further, if you were to discover that this afternoon there is a football match on which the 
agent would much prefer to watch than to regain his health, the same evaporation occurs. 
Thus, hypothetical imperatives are highly susceptible to changes in the constitution of the 
agent and to his peculiar preferences. 
Kant emphatically argued that moral prescriptions are not like hypothetical 
imperatives. They are applied to the agent in virtue of the circumstances, and an 
overwhelming desire to perform an action forbidden by morality will not make the moral 
requirement to abstain evaporate. Thus, moral prescriptions are categorical in nature. In 
Kant’s words, “the categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as 
objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end” (1785/1997: 4:414). This 
objective necessity is why Philippa Foot (19725) describes the categorical understanding of 
morality as ‘inescapable’. Hence, if Øing in circumstances C is morally required, Øing must be 
done by any agent who finds himself in C, despite any unusual desires he may have. 
However, morality is not the only institution which places demands upon agents regardless 
of their desires. Games, for example, require that everyone plays by the rules despite 
potential desires satisfied by cheating. 
Following Foot, we shall now turn our attention to the institution of etiquette. Foot 
famously observed that the behavioural imperatives of etiquette share the ‘non-
evaporability’ of morality. If it is true according to the regulations of etiquette that “one 
ought not speak with one’s mouth full,” this demand applies equally to an agent who cares 
about etiquette as to one who does not. It applies equally to an agent who is aware of the 
demands of etiquette as to one who is not. Significantly, it applies to an agent with a strong 
                                                          
5
 All further references to Foot are also to this paper. 
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desire to flaunt the demands of etiquette, as the unrepentant murderer has to moral 
requirement. For example, if one were in a position to win a large bet by annoying a friend 
over lunch, the desire to win the bet would provide strong personal reasons to talk with 
one’s mouth full, thereby acting contrary to the requirements of etiquette. Nevertheless, 
the imperative of etiquette still applies, and as such the institutional requirement to refrain 
from speaking with one’s mouth full remains steadfast despite the unusual desires caused 
by the bet. Likely a person who is dedicated to, or immersed in, the institution of etiquette 
(say, an etiquette teacher) would still say that one ought not speak with one’s mouth full, 
despite the bet. However, one entirely uncommitted to etiquette might say there is in fact 
no reason to conform to its institutional requirements. 
Despite the above considerations, I suspect the reader, in lieu of unusually strong 
allegiance to etiquette, would advise winning the bet over acceding to the rules of etiquette. 
This is in stark contrast with a potential equivalent case where one serves to win a large bet 
by torturing a baby. The categorical imperative that one ought not speak with one’s mouth 
full did not evaporate, but was outweighed by the bet6. The categorical moral imperative 
that one ought not torture babies also does not evaporate, but moreover is not (and cannot 
be) outweighed by the bet, nor by other desires. Thus, Foot is uneasy that “we find ‘should’ 
used non-hypothetically in some non-moral statements to which no one attributes the 
special dignity and necessity conveyed by the description ‘categorical imperative’.” 
(1972:308). Richard Joyce, the philosopher who has most enthusiastically endorsed and 
expanded upon Mackie’s moral error theory, derives from this that there is something 
special about moral imperatives that goes beyond their categorical nature (2001). Therefore, 
categorical imperativeness is a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of moral 
judgement. Moral prescriptions don't merely apply; they demand. Therefore we must 
                                                          
6
 Note, however, that to an absolute non-subscriber of etiquette, the imperative did not even provide 
a reason that needed to be outweighed. 
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differentiate weak and strong categorical imperatives. A weak categorical imperative is 
exemplified by the requirements of etiquette, and (whilst from the perspective of the 
institution never evaporating) can be outweighed by other desires to the extent that it 
presents no reason for action7. However, moral discourse purports to consist of strong 
categorical imperatives that always provide reasons. Hence it is essential to identify the 
‘extra ingredient’ that differentiates the strong categorical imperatives of morality from the 
weak imperatives of etiquette, chess and gladiatorial combat8. 
Foot concludes that no such ‘fugitive thought’ is to be found - that the imperatives of 
morality are after all merely institutional, weak categorical imperatives (Joyce’s terminology, 
not hers). She accuses Kant and his followers of artificially imbuing moral imperatives with a 
“magic force” (1972:315). Thus, Foot accepts that a moral imperative is only authoritative to 
one for whom the imperative provides reasons. Joyce agrees that all valid imperatives have 
this characteristic, but maintains that what it takes for an imperative to be moral is, inter 
alia, universally applicable authority: providing reasons to any agent. Thus, for Joyce, the 
troubling nature of the elusive fugitive thought is not only an issue for the deontological 
moral conception, but a challenge for moral discourse as a whole. Therefore, on behalf of 
the moral realist Joyce seeks to make some sense of strong, non-institutional categorical 
imperatives. 
 
1.2 Objective Prescriptivity 
Thus far, we have established that what differentiates the strong categorical 
imperatives of moral discourse from the weak categorical imperatives of etiquette is that 
moral imperatives are authoritative for any agent, and thus objectively prescriptive. Joyce’s 
                                                          
7
 Say, the imperatives of halal meat preparation for a Buddhist. 
8
 For useful explication of weak categorical imperatives, see the story of Celadus the unwilling 
gladiator in Chapter 2 of Joyce (2001). 
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(2001) preferred method of explicating this authority is through the provision of reasons. As 
such, an imperative is authoritative only if it provides a reason for action. Therefore, Joyce 
presents what he calls 'Mackie's Platitude': “It is necessary and a priori that, for an agent x, if 
x ought to Ø, then x has a reason to Ø” (2001:38). As such, the term ‘ought’ is taken to mean 
'has a reason'. Mackie’s platitude is supported by the common sense understanding of the 
need to extrapolate reasons from a valid ‘ought’. Say one tells an agent he ought Ø, and his 
response is "why?". If no answer can be found for this fair request for reasons, there is no 
rational basis for the ought.  
Of course, moral discourse can be construed so as not to imply objective 
prescriptivity. One such attempt is explored in detail in Chapter Two. However, Joyce argues 
this is not how competent users of the term moral would conceive and use it. Joyce seeks to 
"motivate a sense of unease" about the possibility that morality might not be objectively 
prescriptive (2001)9. Consider again the unrepentant murderer. If through his unusual 
constitution he truly has no reason to refrain, what sense can be made of demanding he 
ought? Yet moral discourse does not hesitate to make this demand. Joyce maintains that it is 
unacceptable that such use of moral imperatives might turn out to be insubstantial in this 
way. Rather, moral imperatives are deemed to be backed by the force of reason, and thus 
have authority for any agent. 
However, it is essential to note that characterising moral judgements in this way need 
not imply that a moral prescription will necessarily force an agent to act morally. Empirical 
observation quickly demonstrates that, no matter how one conceives morality, there are 
agents who act contrary to its prescriptions. This occurs even in agents who care a lot about 
morality and make sincere moral judgements themselves. Other desires can be so powerful 
                                                          
9
 Joyce later clarifies that the idea behind objective prescriptivity is difficult to express, and best 
captured by “an extremely inchoate presupposition, using a term like “practical oomph” *…+ and 
possibly providing a bunch of examples *…+ in order to try and capture the “feel” of moral authority.” 
(2011:6) 
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as to outweigh the desire satisfied by behaving morally10. Therefore, to make sense of 
objective prescriptions is not to search for actions which everybody (in fact) performs. Rather, 
the search is for actions which any given agent ought (or ought not) do when in the relevant 
circumstances. As agents often fail to do what they ought, all that is required is that the 
moral imperative provides a valid reason for any agent. An ought without an accompanying 
reason quickly begins to look lonely and irrational. Note, however, that there are various 
theories regarding what is needed in order to make a reason ‘valid’, which shall be explored 
throughout the rest of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, if certain circumstances indicate reasons for a particular action to be 
performed by any agent, the accompanying imperative looks like a candidate for a true, 
objectively prescriptive moral claim. If such a circumstance and its accompanying imperative 
can be found, the central premise of the error theory that all moral claims are false is itself 
falsified, and the error theory is sunk. Note, however, that the class of agents for whom a 
valid moral imperative must give reasons includes all agents we consider bound by morality 
in all possible worlds. Therefore, even if all actual agents have a reason to comply, if this is 
not so for a non-actual but possible agent, the imperative is not universally valid. Moreover, 
if there are possible agents whose constitution ensures that no imperatives are universally 
valid, the error theory is necessarily true and moral discourse fails to refer in every possible 
world. 
Furthermore, such an imperative would need to coherently fit within a folk 
conception of moral requirement. If, for example, it could be found that every agent actually 
has a reason to clean their teeth after eating, this would be at best an objectively 
prescriptive imperative of hygiene. In Joyce's words: "a theory of imperatives that managed 
to supply strong categorical imperatives - that located Foot's "fugitive thought" - but for 
                                                          
10
 Assuming there is such a desire; see the next section. 
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things like "Kill anyone who annoys you", "Steal when you can," etc., simply would not be a 
morality." (2001:67). Nevertheless, this appears to be a justifiable route through which to 
investigate the presuppositions underlying moral discourse. Thus, we shall explore the 
nature of reasons for action. 
 
1.3 Internal and External Reasons 
There are various competing accounts regarding what it takes for an agent to have a 
‘valid’ or ‘real’ reason for action. The stance one takes towards these views will determine 
the nature of the project to find universally authoritative imperatives. Thus we shall briefly 
examine the various kinds of reasons. The first distinction is between subjective and 
objective reasons. Imagine the case of Wilfred, an agent who is currently very thirsty. There 
is a cup in front of Wilfred which he believes to contain water, and insofar as he is thirsty, he 
has a subjective reason to drink the water. However, unbeknownst to Wilfred the cup 
actually contains poison, and thus he has an objective reason to refrain from drinking. 
Hence, the subjectivity or objectivity of reasons is dependent upon how well informed the 
agent in question is. However, an imperative to Wilfred not to drink validly connects to his 
desires despite his ignorance. Thus, we must distinguish internal and external reasons as per 
Bernard Williams (1981). Williams explains that an internal reason is one appropriately 
connected to the agent’s desires, which could potentially come to motivate the agent, were 
he to be perfectly rational and armed with true beliefs. An external reason, however, fails to 
have such a potential connection and thus applies regardless of the agent’s desires. Hence, 
Wilfred has an internal objective reason not to drink by virtue of his de dicto desire not to 
drink poison. 
There is a strong intuition that one is only rational to the extent that one is guided by 
subjective internal reasons. Thus, it would in fact be irrational (though unwittingly fortunate) 
Moral Discourse: Error-Ridden or Relatively Defensible? 
11 of 52 
for Wilfred not to drink from the cup. However, if he were to become aware of the actual 
contents of the cup he would admit that there was a reason not to drink the whole time, and 
furthermore no reason to drink. This helpfully illustrates a potential disconnect between 
what it is rational to do and what one has a reason to do, depending on one’s understanding 
of reasons and rationality11. 
Moreover, some philosophers such as David Brink (1989) have argued that, in fact, 
externalism about reasons is the best framework within which to understand moral 
prescriptions, as expounded by Cornell realism. As such, moral reasons for action are 
completely divorced from the psychology of the agents in question12. Brink’s externalist 
moral realism ardently endorses conceiving morality as objectively prescriptive. Indeed, the 
notion that moral imperatives are not dependent upon agents’ desires is easily explicable if 
reasons are separate from desires. However, this is at the expense of alienating the agent 
from his own reasons. If my ‘real’ reasons for action are, in fact, completely unrelated to my 
desires, what sense can be made of saying that they are my reasons? There is a real debate 
to be had here, though beyond the scope of this thesis. I will follow Joyce’s (and Williams’) 
example in rejecting external reasons as a valid way to authoritatively connect imperatives 
to agents. 
Therefore, our search is now restricted to the realm of internal reasons: those which 
can be coherently connected to the desires of the agents in question. However, there are 
various ways of conceiving the precise nature of this connection. These views can be 
understood as different incarnations of the institution of practical rationality, the 
mechanism by which all rational agents evaluate reasons for action, and deliberate what to 
do. 
                                                          
11
 For more on this dichotomy see John Broome’s (2007) Does Rationality Consist In Responding 
Correctly To Reasons? and Nicholas Southwood’s (2008) Vindicating The Normativity Of Rationality. 
12
 The Kantian (1785/1997) understanding of morality as an appeal to rational consistency also 
divorces moral reasons from an agent’s desires. 
Moral Discourse: Error-Ridden or Relatively Defensible? 
12 of 52 
1.4 Practical Rationality 
Joyce (2001) has argued that the reasons alluded to by institutional categorical 
imperatives suffer from inapplicability if the agent in question cares little for the institution. 
When confronted with a demand of etiquette, one may reasonably ask "So what?" After all, 
why care about what etiquette requires if you do not subscribe to it as an institution? Why 
care more about etiquette than (say) kosher? However, the moral institution uniquely13 
purports to require subscription. When the unrepentant murderer breaks a moral 
prohibition, we say that he is (on some level) breaking a rule that is his rule. Thus, in order to 
justify this intuition, the challenge is to find an institution to which everybody (if not 
consciously, then tacitly) subscribes. Such an institution could potentially underwrite moral 
prescriptions through providing reasons connected in some way to every agent’s desires and 
justifying the presupposition of objective prescriptivity. 
Joyce posits that an institution which could underwrite moral imperatives by providing 
universally applicable reasons may find its roots in rational prescriptions. Thus, he alights 
upon the institution of practical rationality. Cleverly, Joyce notes that one who questions 
practical rationality externally (as one might question other institutions such as etiquette) 
has unwittingly demonstrated his allegiance to practical rationality itself. "Why should I care 
about practical rationality?" is a question asking for reasons to adopt a system of evaluating 
reasons, but to ask for such a reason implies that one is already in the business of evaluating 
reasons, and thus already subscribed to practical rationality. While an agent who never asks 
this question will not fall into Joyce’s ‘trap’, the addition of idealised rationality which we 
shall see in Michael Smith’s non-Humean instrumentalism neatly ensures subscription to 
practical rationality. 
                                                          
13
 Perhaps uniquely only in the practical realm. The epistemic imperatives of theoretical rationality, 
such as “Don‘t believe in things unless you have some evidence that they exist” also appear to require 
subscription. 
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Notably, Foot has argued that such a project is doomed from the outset, as 
irrationality necessarily involves frustrating one’s own ends and immorality need not involve 
this. Nevertheless, having established practical rationality as an 'un-so-what-able' institution, 
let us examine whether it might somehow vindicate objectively prescriptive moral 
judgements. However, as hinted earlier, the precise nature of practical rationality remains 
debatable. Specifically, which reasons count as validly connected to the desires of the agent 
hinges upon how this institution is construed. Following Joyce, we shall examine 
instrumentalism as per Hume, followed by Michael Smith’s broader account of instrumental 
reasons. 
 
1.5 Humean Instrumentalism 
The Humean (1739/1978) understanding of practical rationality derives reasons 
directly from the desires of the agent. As such, what one rationally ought do is what one 
most desires. In terms of reasons, the Humean thesis is that if one desires X, and Øing is the 
best way to make X come about, one has a reason to Ø. Thus an agent has a reason to 
perform any action which best furthers any of his desires. This implies the possibility of 
having real reasons to perform a variety of different actions in the same circumstances, 
which is intuitively the case. Moreover, these desires could correspond with actions which 
promote dramatically different outcomes. However, as we have seen, objective 
prescriptions only require the existence of a reason to act morally that can be validly 
connected to any individual’s desires in order to be vindicated. 
Within the Humean framework it is possible that a moral imperative could turn out to 
be true if every agent has a desire which is satisfied by the action morally prescribed, thus 
providing a subjective internal reason. For example, it could be that refraining from murder 
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satisfies some desire present in every agent14. Such desires could be scattered and varied, 
but if every agent has his own reason the objective prescription is justified. However, to 
investigate such a possibility is an empirical nightmare, and Joyce (2000, 2001) is pessimistic 
about the potential of this project. In any case, such a state of affairs could never be 
discovered from an armchair. However, perhaps there is a single, ubiquitous (perhaps 
necessary) desire that could ground the truth of a moral prescription. An intuitive place to 
search for a desire held by every agent is in the domain of self-interest. Surely every 
individual has reason to further his own ends. Thus, the project here is to ground an 
apparently selfless moral prescription such as "Don't steal" in a sophisticated self-interest. 
Whilst this Hobbesian (1651/1924) moral conception has every reason to succeed 
when dealing with normally constituted agents, there is reason to doubt its applicability in 
certain cases. Initially, note that there are often prudential reasons to behave morally. If you 
are known as a liar, the community will not trust you. Thus the desire to be trusted is 
frustrated. If you steal and are caught, you will be imprisoned, frustrating the desire for 
freedom. Conversely, if you are generous, you will be rewarded and liked. However, despite 
this robust correlation between prudence and morally good action, Joyce argues that any 
attempt to ground reasons to behave morally in prudential self-interest will fail. This is 
because reasons to act morally must be universal, and thus validly connect to the desires of 
unusual individuals. While prudence might provide the majority of agents with reason to act 
morally in most situations, if the philosopher is allowed free rein to manipulate the details of 
the agent and the situation, the prescriptions of prudence and morality drift apart. 
Joyce reminds us that this project makes little headway against Gyges, the Lydian 
shepherd from Plato's Republic (Cooper, 1997). Gyges stumbles upon a ring of invisibility, 
which he uses to fulfil his basest and most immoral desires anonymously because of his self-
                                                          
14
 Perhaps a desire to be benevolent in some people, a desire to remain unpunished in others, etc. 
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interest! For any prudential reason to refrain that one cares to offer Gyges, the philosopher 
can tweak his desires and circumstances to make it inapplicable. Perhaps Gyges’ rampant 
raping would foster a sense of fear and unease in the community which frustrates his desire 
to have happy and pleasant friends. However, if he exclusively inflicts harm in some nearby 
village, this desire need not be frustrated. Alternatively, perhaps Gyges is harming himself 
through his actions, sacrificing a desire for “inward peace of mind, consciousness of 
integrity, a satisfactory review of *his+ own conduct” (Hume, 1983, quoted in Joyce 2001:33). 
To justify this claim, the onus is on the defender of morality rooted in Humean 
instrumentalism to argue that the nature of humanity is such that one who acts as Gyges 
does necessarily sacrifices the characteristics listed by Hume, which Joyce describes as 
“simply silly” (2000:6). To argue that human nature exhibits such homogeneity is a difficult 
undertaking; it is entirely possible that some people are simply depraved. 
On Hume’s view, there are two ways to be practically irrational, or fail to act in 
accordance with one’s own practical reasons. Firstly, one can have a desire based on a false 
belief. For example, if you are convinced that doing a headstand for a full day (despite 
extreme discomfort) will bring you wealth that you greatly desire, you will deem yourself to 
have a reason to put yourself through a painful day of inversion. However, if the headstand 
is in actuality unrelated to wealth, Hume will say that in reality you have no reason to do so. 
Nevertheless, strictly speaking the irrationality is at the level of the false belief, not the 
action. Furthermore, as soon as the belief is corrected, the desire will evaporate15. Secondly, 
one can have a false belief about how to satisfy a desire, poorly weigh desires against each 
other, or perform an irrational action through weakness of will. These all revolve around 
                                                          
15
 “Since a passion can never, in any sense, be call’d unreasonable, but when founded on a false 
supposition, or when it chuses means insufficient for the design’d end, ’tis impossible, that reason 
and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions. The 
moment we perceive the falshood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions 
yield to our reason without any opposition.” (Treatise 2.3.3) 
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reflecting upon the rationality of one’s action and finding it wanting. However, perhaps it is 
regret itself that is irrational, or perhaps one must have acted on one‘s strongest desire at 
the time (particularly if the strength of desires is determined by which ones lead to action). 
Thus, while most of Hume’s explication of practical rationality reads as a description of 
practical deliberation, it is worth noting that there is room for rational error on this view. 
However, the trouble here is that Gyges' base deeds appear to be perfectly aligned 
with his Humean reasons. The Humean understanding of the relationship between desires 
and reasons does not provide Gyges with any reason to refrain: it is quite possible that he 
has no false beliefs and is being practically rational. Nevertheless, his actions do not evade 
our moral judgement. What he did was morally wrong, and Joyce wants to ‘motivate a sense 
of unease’ that while we make a demand of Gyges that he ought not do these things, we are 
not supplying him with a reason to do as we claim he ought. When Gyges asks why he ought 
not do something he has no desire (or reason) to refrain from doing, if all we can say is "you 
simply mustn't!", it is Gyges who appears to be the reasonable one, and the repeated 
imperative begins to sound rather desperate. The defender of Humean instrumentalism can 
choose to concede that on his view one cannot validly claim that Gyges ought not commit 
his crimes. However, to do so is to admit the failure of the project to ground objectively 
prescriptive moral imperatives. As moral language is precisely that with which we would, as 
a matter of fact, censure Gyges, that it might turn out not to apply to him is unacceptable. 
Joyce summarises the situation as follows: “If a system of imperatives leaves the harmful 
wielder of the ring of Gyges uncensured as he wreaks havoc then it is not a moral 
system.”(2000:6). 
Therefore, if morality is underpinned by practical rationality and we endorse Humean 
instrumentalism we end up with an inescapable set of escapable propositions. This is 
because (as cleverly shown by Joyce) the institution of practical rationality is inescapable 
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(un-so-what-able), though any given prescription is escapable through citing particular 
unusual desires. This is an unsatisfactory result, as we have apparently demonstrated the 
inescapability of the moral institution without allowing it any specific, inescapable (and thus 
true) claims. Therefore, the exploration of Humean instrumentalism appears to be a dead 
end. In search for a more universal, convergent understanding of ‘real’ reasons we now turn 
to Michael Smith. 
 
1.6 Michael Smith’s Non-Humean Instrumentalism 
It has been demonstrated that Humean instrumentalism fails to justify objective 
prescriptions. Hume and Foot are content to accept that moral talk simply fails to 
authoritatively address Gyges. However, Joyce is dissatisfied with this outcome; by his lights 
such failure indicates systematic error in moral discourse. Thus, to charitably bolster the 
case of the moral realist, we seek a theory of practical rationality which presents an 
alternative connection between desires and reasons, hopefully establishing some reasons 
which would speak authoritatively to Gyges. 
In order to do so, Joyce turns to Michael Smith’s (1994) account of practical 
rationality. Recall the case of Wilfred. Smith intends to capture the intuition that Wilfred has 
a real reason not to drink from his cup, and extends the domain of valid reasons to include 
all internal reasons (subjective and objective), minus those rooted in irrationality. Thus, 
Smith’s understanding of instrumentalism removes epistemological inadequacy and poor 
evaluation of one’s own desires from the understanding of practical rationality. As such, 
Smith would have us imagine, for every agent (S), an ideally placed equivalent of that agent 
(S+). Significantly, S+ is not circularly idealised in terms of morality. Instead, S+ retains all of 
the subjective desires and ends of S, but is also fully rational and has complete epistemic 
access to the state of the world and the consequences of his actions. Hence S+ is considers 
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all internal reasons, including the objective reasons S is unaware of. Moreover, S can be 
considered to have a normative reason to Ø by virtue of S+ ‘recommending’ Øing. Consider 
the following claim: “I accept that if I were entirely rational and fully aware of the state of 
the world I would have a reason to Ø, yet I do not have a reason to Ø”. This declaration is 
unintelligible, as to be more rational and informed is to be in a better position to judge what 
actions one has a reason to do. In the case of Wilfred, his S+ would have recommended he 
not drink the poison, and pointed out that he has no reason to drink it. If our reasons to 
conform to a moral imperative are akin to Wilfred’s reason not to drink, they are valid. 
Indeed, if each time one (for example) tortures a baby one is (though unaware of the fact) 
subtly ‘poisoning’ oneself, there is a real reason to refrain. 
Therefore, the pertinent question becomes whether, stripped of irrationality and 
ignorance, there might be some circumstances in which every agent would have a reason to 
perform a given moral imperative. In other words, this is an analysis of whether the set of 
each agent’s S+ would converge upon any prescriptions. If there is convergence (as Smith 
believes), we are approaching a valid objectively prescriptive claim, and vindicating objective 
moral realism in virtue of the existence of a true moral prescription. If some moral claims are 
true (even if very few) then the discourse does not fail to refer, and in fact we have learned 
something: there are very few moral truths. However, if the idealised agents remain 
divergent in the way S's are this argument has no traction against the error theory. 
Joyce (2001) encourages us to imagine an agent (a la Gyges) who breaks a promise 
merely on the basis of inconvenience and the fact that he can avoid punishment, regardless 
of the detrimental impact it will have on others. Moral discourse does not hesitate to 
condemn this action. However, the question remains as to whether S+ would, in fact, advise 
S not to break the promise, despite a lack of negative consequences. In order to argue that 
S+ would provide a reason for S to refrain from promise-breaking it needs to be shown 
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precisely how S is necessarily either (a) failing to be rational, or (b) ignorant of some relevant 
fact, or both. Why should this be the case? In Foot’s words, “The fact is that the man who 
rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but 
not of inconsistency” (1972:310). S+ derives his desires directly from S, and is thus entirely 
dependent upon S's constitution. Therefore, it is intuitive to expect a similar kind of variation 
amongst ideal selves as we observe amongst agents. However, this is at heart an empirical 
question which remains unanswered. 
This debate remains very much open and live. The objective moral realist is free to 
mount an argument about why each agent’s S+ would, in fact, converge upon some moral 
prescription. Alternately, he could propose a different formulation of practical rationality, or 
another institution altogether from which to underwrite strong categorical imperatives. 
However, such discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus we shall abandon the 
search for objectively prescriptive reasons here, having elucidated the kind of values the 
error theorist thinks underpin moral discourse, and what it would take for them to exist. 
 
1.7 Summary and Preview 
In order to vindicate moral realism, valid objective prescriptions must be found, or 
their dispensability demonstrated. I conclude that this attempt to derive objectively 
prescriptive values from practical rationality is a failure. However, this does not necessarily 
preclude the possibility that such values could be rooted elsewhere. Nevertheless, until a 
more appealing strategy for finding objective values presents itself, an error theory of 
morality is called for. However, some philosophers have denied that objective prescriptivity 
is a necessary feature of moral discourse, which of course emancipates morality from the 
threat of this argument for error theory. One such philosopher is Stephen Finlay, and his 
objection to Mackie and Joyce is discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Two: The Dialectic between Joyce and Finlay 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
It has been shown that Richard Joyce’s (2001) defence of the moral error theory can 
be understood as a two-step argument: firstly identifying the conceptual presuppositions of 
moral discourse, and secondly arguing that these commitments are philosophically 
indefensible. Thus, there are two different methods through which an opponent might 
criticise the error theory. The first, which Joyce dubs the 'head-on' strategy, is to disagree 
with the error theorists' ontological claims. Such an opponent accepts the error theorists’ 
rich, objectively prescriptive conceptualisation of morality but promotes optimism about the 
existence of these values. Hence this strategy might be adopted by the objective moral 
realist. If there are real reasons underpinning universally valid imperatives, some moral 
claims are true. Perhaps such an opponent would criticise the rigour of Joyce's attempt to 
ground these imperatives in practical rationality. Alternatively she might mount her own 
attempt to appeal to another institution in order to underwrite objective prescriptivity. 
There are many ways such an argument might be formulated, and Joyce views this tack as 
the "only hope" for the opponent of error theory. 
The second, 'concessive' strategy, accepts the error theorists' sparse ontology, 
endorsing the ontological denial of objectively prescriptive values. Instead, this opponent 
attacks the presupposition that these values must exist to validate moral discourse. If such 
values are, in fact, not integral to morality, the apparent failure of practical rationality to 
provide universally authoritative reasons as per Chapter One is insignificant. Stephen Finlay 
notably16 utilises the concessive strategy in The Error in the Error Theory (2008), attempting 
                                                          
16
 In fact, Finlay’s paper won the 2008 Australasian Journal of Philosophy Best Paper Award. 
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to neutralise the error theorists’ project before it gets off the ground. This chapter evaluates 
Finlay's criticisms, Joyce's (2011) rebuttal, and Finlay's (2011) re-rebuttal. 
 
2.1 Relativistic Moral Discourse: A Legitimate Threat to Error Theory 
Mackie (1977) denied the existence of objective values. However, he never went so 
far as to deny that there are values at all. Rather, he argued that all genuine value is relative 
to some standard or end17. As such, if refraining from speaking with one’s mouth full is a 
value dictated by etiquette, one should refrain according to (say) the end of not disgusting 
one’s tablemates. If you think this end is valuable, you have a reason to refrain. Hence, 
rightness-according-to-an-institution and rightness-relative-to-an-end notably share the 
feature of escapability. That is, if one does not subscribe to the institution or end, one will 
not have a reason to act as the standard requires. Hence, imperatives about what someone 
ought do, (construed as appeals to real reasons that validly connect to the agent’s desires) 
will fail to be universally applicable, as humanity is far from homogenous in terms of 
subscription to institutions and ends. 
Section 1.1 intended to motivate a sense of unease that moral imperatives might be 
merely institutional, or contingent upon subscription to certain ends. If the reason-bringing 
power of morality is limited in this way then there is no difference in authority between 
(say) telling Gyges that morality demands he stop raping and telling him that the laws of 
kosher demand that he not eat ham afterwards. Nevertheless, Stephen Finlay (2008) argues 
that even moral value is relative to standards or ends, and is thus metaphysically 
defensible18. As such, moral imperatives imply the existence of authoritative reasons only for 
                                                          
17
 A judgement that something is big, for example, is always relative to a comparison class. Mount 
Everest is big relative to me, but not relative to the sun.  
18
 In this respect, Finlay’s paper can be understood as a rejoinder to Joyce (2001) on behalf of Foot 
(1972), who contended that it was only Kant and his followers who imbued moral discourse with false 
objectivity. 
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agents who share the standard on which the imperative is based. Joyce and Finlay agree on 
this understanding of the limited reason-bringing power of imperatives. However, Joyce 
insists that a genuinely moral imperative must provide authoritative reasons to any agent, 
and thus avers an error theory. In contrast, Finlay argues that relativistic moral discourse is 
not only plausible, but represents moral thought and speech more realistically than an 
objective conception. 
Finlay’s denial that moral discourse presupposes objective values targets the 
incarnation of Mackie’s argument that Joyce (2001) has identified and expanded upon as the 
most promising avenue through which to argue for error. Nevertheless, arguments towards 
error theory can be launched from multiple starting points. Joyce alludes to various other 
potentially flawed presuppositions of moral discourse: “It might be that moral discourse 
presupposes a view of human autonomy which we discover through empirical methods to 
be flawed [see, e.g., Libet 2004]; perhaps it presupposes a view of human character traits 
that we discover through experimental psychology to be wrong [see Doris 2002]; or perhaps 
it presupposes the truth of a kind of internalism that neuroscience and psychopathology 
reveal to be mistaken *see Roskies 2003+.”(2011:2). Joyce criticises Finlay’s failure to locate 
and rebut other flawed presuppositions as a “major strategic weakness”. However, Finlay 
(2011) legitimately responds that by these standards any journal-length attack upon the 
error theory will inevitably be inadequate. Furthermore, Finlay’s (2008) paper explicitly 
admits that the error theorist can viably posit other flawed presuppositions. As arguments 
from objective prescriptivity to error underwrite most of Joyce’s publications on the topic 
(2000, 2001, 2007) if Finlay can demonstrate its dispensability to moral discourse, Joyce’s 
argument requires a complete overhaul. Therefore, Finlay’s paper remains a legitimate 
threat to moral error theory through attacking its most popular and effective argument. 
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2.2 Locating Finlay’s Objection within Joyce’s Master Argument 
There is a terminological dispute that runs through this argument which requires 
clarification. For the sake of brevity I shall skip any petty squabbles about ‘correct’ 
terminology or what Mackie did or did not say and briefly sketch how the terms are used 
here. Finlay refers to ‘absolute values’ and ‘absolute authority’, whilst Joyce prefers 
‘objective values’ and ‘objective prescriptivity’. I shall take them to be talking about the same 
thing, though primarily utilising Joyce’s terminology here. Whilst lamenting Finlay’s choice of 
the term ‘absolute’, Joyce points out that within metaethics, absolutism stands opposed to 
relativism differently than objectivity stands to non-objectivity. Yet in the same breath he 
admits that “the vernacular usage of ‘absolute,’ however, need have nothing to do with 
relativism.” (2011:2). I contend that the extent to which Finlay’s objections succeed or fail in 
challenging the error theory rests not upon his choice of words. 
Joyce’s (2011:6) rebuttal provides a useful clarification of the structure of his master 
argument for error theory. He accuses Finlay (2008) of understanding his argument as the 
following: 
 F1) Morality is conceptually nonrelativistic. 
 F2) In fact, a nonrelativistic morality is indefensible. 
Thus, the moral error theory is established. 
Whilst his argument in actuality is (2011:7): 
J1) Morality conceptually involves non-institutional categorical imperatives (NICIs). 
Hypothesis: Moral non-institutional categorical imperatives are rational requirements. 
 i) Rational requirements are relativistic (in a certain way).  
 ii) But moral requirements are nonrelativistic (in that way), hence  
 iii) Moral requirements cannot be rational requirements.  
J2) In fact, non-institutional categorical imperatives are indefensible.  
Thus, the moral error theory is established. 
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Joyce argues that Finlay’s defence of moral relativism, through aiming to disprove F1, 
actually targets the dispensable proposition (ii). However, despite Joyce’s claim that his J1 
has “no obvious connection to moral relativism” (2011:4), I argue that Finlay’s attack 
remains significant, and this reiteration helpfully allows us to locate it in the context of the 
overarching argument. As Joyce interprets Finlay’s arguments as an attack upon (ii), he finds 
them innocuous, for (ii) exists only in the service of rejecting Hypothesis as a plausible way of 
defending NICIs. Furthermore, Hypothesis functions merely to show that the most likely 
candidate for denying J2 is unsuccessful. As Finlay follows Joyce in rejecting Hypothesis and 
accepting J2, were his arguments for relativism targeted at (ii), this would be a poor strategy 
indeed. In actuality, Finlay’s relativistic proposal intends to deny J1: he disagrees that 
morality conceptually involves non-institutional categorical imperatives. If moral values are, 
in fact, end-relational in the way Finlay argues then they are merely institutional: J1 is false 
and Joyce’s master argument fails. Thus, Finlay’s attack remains a legitimate threat, and we 
shall examine his re-interpretation of the behaviours surrounding moral discourse. 
 
2.3 Evaluating the Evidence 
A primary goal of Finlay’s (2008) paper is to re-evaluate the apparent evidence that 
morality is understood as objectively prescriptive. He intends to demonstrate that moral 
thought and speech is not only validly interpreted as reflecting a relational understanding of 
morality, but actually better explained by such an understanding. As ultimately Joyce argues 
that the content of a concept is intimately related to its use(s), it is crucial for us to 
understand Finlay’s competing explanation of empirically observed behaviours. Finlay 
identifies seven ostensible sources of evidence for the objective characterisation of morality. 
The first of these is reflective evidence. This is an appeal to the ways in which ordinary 
users of moral discourse consciously conceive of their concept. Finlay wishes to dispel the 
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intuition that most people would, upon reflection, say that their moral values are objective. 
He points out that many prominent thinkers throughout history have espoused relativistic 
moral discourse19, and that a relativistic bent is observed in undergraduate philosophy 
students. Finlay presents an analogy from morality to motion in order to demonstrate that 
reflective evidence can be misleading20. Ancient users of motion discourse likely would have 
described their motion judgements as non-relative. However, we now view ‘absolute’ 
motion as absurd, as the idea of movement only makes sense relative to some other object 
or frame of reference. Nevertheless, we do not uncharitably accuse ancient users of motion-
talk and motion-thought of utilising a concept that is fundamentally flawed. Instead, we 
judge that the reflective evidence fails to accurately depict the concept at play. 
Thus, folk can be genuinely unaware of the content of the concept they are actually 
employing. Joyce and Finlay agree upon this. Hence, even an agent who enthusiastically 
avows objectivity as central to moral discourse may be charitably understood as sincerely 
misunderstanding his own concept. Likewise, an agent convinced morality is relativistic can 
belie this stance through (say) believing that Gyges is doing wrong by his own standards or 
believing he has a reason to stop his rampant raping. Perhaps all we can derive from this is 
that reflective evidence counts for little. A relativistic or objective reflective understanding 
of moral discourse could be ubiquitously accepted whilst, in fact, the other is actually at 
play. Thus reflective evidence tips the balance in favour of neither conception21. 
The second appeal is to linguistic evidence. Finlay posits that a prominent reason 
objectivity is attributed to moral imperatives is that their relativistic nature is never 
vocalised. Thus, moral imperatives may be hypothetical after all, with the “if you 
                                                          
19
 From ancient thinkers such as Protagoras (Cooper, 1997) to current metaethical relativists such as 
Gilbert Harman (1975). 
20
 Pre-relative motion discourse shall become one of our paradigmatic discourses for which an error 
theory is not appropriate, despite a flawed presupposition. 
21
 As famously expressed by Hilary Putnam, "'meanings' just ain't in the head." (1975:227) 
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want/value…” left tacit. Finlay contends that relativity may remain unsaid for the sake of 
rhetorical flourish. It is well accepted (Mackie, 1977; West, 2010) that a primary function of 
moral discourse is to extract certain desirable behaviours from other agents. Thus, as 
explicitly relativised imperatives are less effective in achieving this goal, there is compelling 
reason for omission. Moreover, perhaps constantly vocalised relativisation would become 
tedious and long-winded. Finlay imagines the captain of the All Blacks rugby team, during a 
huddle, relativising his advice with “If you want to win the game...”. Clearly, it would be 
unnecessary, frustrating, and even silly. Nevertheless, he is not saying anything new or 
different when he adds the relativising prefix, but merely making explicit that which need 
not be: the shared goal of wanting to win is assumed, and when verbalised makes the 
speaker seem foolish. Perhaps, then, in the moral domain, we fail to prefix our claims with 
“relative to standard S…” for two reasons. Firstly, because this omission increases the 
apparent power of the imperative, and secondly because a shared standard is assumed. 
However, Joyce (2011) questions the coherence of tacit relativity and the relevance of 
the All Blacks analogy to moral discourse. Imagine the judge at the Nuremberg trials, while 
sentencing a Nazi war criminal, relativising his moral condemnation with “…according to our 
standards, and furthermore I demand you subscribe to these standards.” If Finlay’s 
understanding is valid the meaning of the claim has not changed; the tacit elements have 
merely been verbalised. However, would we expect from his audience mild frustration akin 
to the All Blacks example because he made the tacit explicit? Joyce asserts that the audience 
would be outraged, and demand more from the judge. Such a reaction makes no sense if he 
is actually saying the same thing. By changing the ‘locus of moral condemnation’ from a 
simple connection between the criminal and his crimes to a tripartite connection between 
us (and our standards), the criminal and the crime, we are struck by the contingency of the 
judgement. If moral truth is merely institutional in this way, this moral condemnation is akin 
to condemning an agent who violated some standard of etiquette. Understandably, we are 
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uncomfortable punishing violating such an institutional imperative, and we want the moral 
case to be different. Ultimately, Joyce’s case against tacit relativism can be summarised as 
follows: “It would be astonishing if adding “…irrespective of standards” raises no eyebrows, 
but adding “…relative to our standards” prompts outrage, while in fact it is the latter kind of 
suffix that is really in play tacitly” (2011:9). Quite so; if making objectivity explicit fails to 
alter the response to a moral imperative whereas explicitly relative imperatives are treated 
entirely differently, Finlay’s tacit relativism prompts suspicion22. Thus the linguistic evidence 
in favour of objective prescriptivity remains robust. 
The third source of evidence Finlay dubs appraisal evidence. This is a nod to Joyce’s 
(2001) insistence that moral imperatives are not sensitive to changes in the subjective 
constitution of the wrongdoer. As such, moral requirement cannot be avoided through citing 
unusual desires. This inescapability is central to the notion of a categorical imperative. Joyce 
further argues that for any given circumstances, if there is an action which is morally 
required it presents authoritative reasons for any agent. However, Finlay derives a different 
conclusion form the same observations. His preferred theory relativises the truth of moral 
claims according to the standards of the person judging. Thus, if Ted believes Øing is wrong 
in C according to standard S he will not retract that judgement on the basis of another’s 
desires. However, Ted’s claim can be true whilst Julie also truly claims (relative to S*) that 
there is nothing morally required in C, or that another action is required, or even that Øing is 
morally required in C. Significantly, neither Ted nor Julie will alter their moral judgement 
upon learning of an unusually constituted agent. 
Thus, appraisal evidence is also explained by Finlay’s theory. If moral wrongness is 
relative to the judger’s standards, it follows that changes in the constitution of the ‘judgee’ 
                                                          
22
 In fact, Finlay himself admits that it is a serious objection that “since people don’t ordinarily take 
themselves to be asserting end-relational propositions when they utter ought-sentences, it is most 
unlikely that they are” (2009:335, footnote 41). 
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are irrelevant. As such, while it can be legitimately said of the Nazi war criminal that his 
actions are wrong, this wrongness may fail to have any authority or ‘practical oomph’ for 
him, depending upon his standards. There is a fundamental disagreement here about 
whether this is acceptable, as Joyce believes that we have no business telling someone (say, 
Gyges) what to do if our demand cannot provide him with reasons. In contrast, Finlay thinks 
we can say that Gyges did wrong-according-to-an-end and thus separate the wrongness of 
his action from his psychology. If moral truth is relative such an imperative is licensed, but is 
merely a valid institutional output, with as much authority for Gyges as the imperatives of 
kosher. 
Nevertheless, we clearly differentiate the “special dignity and necessity” (Foot, 1972) 
of moral imperatives from other institutional requirements. Thus, it might appear that Finlay 
fails to distinguish weak from strong categorical imperatives. However, he is well aware of 
the distinction, and like Joyce rejects strong categorical imperatives as indefensible. Rather, 
he argues that weak, institutional categorical imperatives characterise moral discourse. 
Finlay believes that the unique respect for moral imperatives stems from the great value 
placed upon the moral domain. Thus, moral standards and ends are simply the most 
important ends and do not differ in kind from the ends of other institutions. This serves to 
explain why we are particularly precious about violations of moral standards in a way we are 
not in the case of etiquette. Uniquely, perhaps, compliance with moral standards is deemed 
more important than an agent’s happiness. In Finlay’s words, “… we care more about (eg) 
the welfare of children than we do about the happiness of those who may be abusing them, 
and for this reason we do not withdraw our moral appraisals of a person or his actions in 
response to recognizing his personal reasons” (2008:11). Thus, the relativist can accept 
Joyce’s J2 (that non-institutional categorical imperatives are indefensible), as he maintains 
that our peculiar insistence about moral imperatives does not stem from their non-
institutional nature. This raises some questions addressed in section 2.6. 
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Jonas Olson (2010) argues that there is a paradigmatic use of moral discourse, not 
considered by Finlay, which requires objectivity in order to make sense. This is the sense in 
which a moral speaker intends to communicate the existence of reasons to Ø that exist 
independently of any psychological facts about the judgee or the judger. Some uses of moral 
imperatives imply not only a lack of contingence upon the subjective constitution of the 
person judged (appraisal evidence), but also not upon the constitution of the judger. This is 
hinted at by the Nuremberg judge example. Explicitly relativising a moral judgement to one’s 
standards, such that it is clearly incidental that one happens to have said standards, leads 
others to react as though a judgement less powerful than a full-blooded moral one has been 
made. Thus, perhaps a paradigmatic use of moral discourse is to make demands upon others 
without invoking anything about one’s own views. This use of moral imperatives, by which 
the appraiser intends to communicate something about the other agent’s reasons, or the 
ends he is rationally obliged to value, simply makes no sense on Finlay’s account23. However, 
the question remains how central this particular use of moral discourse actually is. 
Furthermore, the relativist will maintain that, charitably understood, moral imperatives 
never intend to indicate the presence of such reasons. 
The following three sources of evidence Finlay treats as different facets of the same 
observation, as they all revolve around interactions between agents with different moral 
standards. Address evidence notes that moral imperatives are often addressed to non-
subscribers despite this fact. The thought here is that it would be strange for people to 
morally condemn others with different standards if moral value is relative to standards, 
which are themselves beyond reproach24. Expectation evidence is a reflection upon the fact 
that moral imperatives addressed to non-subscribers are often accompanied by an 
expectation that the imperative will motivate, or remind the agent of pre-existing 
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 Chapter One lead us to the conclusion that this particular use is metaphysically indefensible. 
24
 What the relativist cannot say is that, whilst morality is relative to standards, some standards are 
better than others, or some standard is correct. 
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motivation. Disputation evidence notes that disagreement occurs between agents with 
fundamentally different moral standards. Moreover, it is assumed by both parties that they 
are disagreeing about something substantial, and univocally utilising moral terminology. This 
assumption that fundamental moral disagreement is at the level of “the fact of the matter” 
reflects a substantial difference between moral dispute and (say) disagreement about ice-
cream flavours. If moral truth is end-relational, these agents should realise that they are 
speaking equivocally, and that the dispute is not genuine. However, the observed 
behaviours reflect no such understanding, and appear to indicate an objective concept at 
play. 
Finlay’s primary reason for rejecting these observations as evidence that moral 
discourse implies objectivity is that such occurrences are “nowhere near as common or 
characteristic of moral discourse as one might think” (2008:13). Finlay sketches what moral 
discourse would look like in a homogenous society: an understandable lack of address, 
expectation or disputation evidence because everybody subscribes to the same ends. He 
then argues that, while our own society is probably the most morally fragmented in history, 
our moral practises are ‘largely continuous’ with those in the homogenous society. Four 
reasons are given. Firstly, even if society encompasses individuals with widely varying moral 
beliefs, most moral discourse will take place between individuals with similar views. 
Secondly, agents assume their interlocutor shares moral standards, such that even their 
relative-to-standards judgements remain authoritative and reason-bringing. Furthermore, 
any apparent absence of shared moral standards can be attributed to one’s opponent 
misrepresenting (purposefully or otherwise) his actual views. Thirdly, Finlay claims that, if 
there is an overt lack of agreement upon moral standards, such dialogue would in actuality 
be abandoned as a vain pursuit, as the equivocation of moral terminology would be 
accepted. For example, in the abortion debate, a pro-life supporter might assume the shared 
standard that killing innocent persons is wrong, and proceed to argue that a foetus is an 
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innocent person. However, if this fundamental standard is not accepted, it is at least not 
obvious that he would feel justified continuing the dialogue. Finally, imbuing an imperative 
with unjustified moral authority (through keeping relativity tacit) provides the illusion of 
additional strength, rhetorically demanding that the implicit standards be adhered to. This is 
not because they are the correct standards, as this begs the question in favour of an 
objective moral conception. Rather, the demand is to comply with the standards one has 
chosen, and values more than the happiness of one’s interlocutor. Thus, Finlay concludes 
that these behaviours are pragmatically explicable, and compatible with the relativist’s 
story. 
However, Finlay here fails to justify his claim that moral discourse in our highly 
fragmented society is largely continuous with the equivalent discourse in a homogenous 
society. Why, for example, assume that most moral disputes occur between agents who 
subscribe to the same standards? Jonas Olson points out that “Even a cursory glance at 
public political debate in many countries will reveal fundamental moral disagreements 
between conservatives and feminists; socialists and neo-liberals; cosmopolitans and 
nationalists; etc.” (2010:18). Even Finlay’s own example of the abortion debate indicates 
that deep-seated moral dispute is very much alive. Despite evidence of fundamental 
disagreement, these debates continue. Perhaps the appearance of divergent standards in 
one’s opponent is interpreted as a misrepresentation, but this can only go so far. After 
lengthy debate, insistence that your opponent actually, deep down, agrees with you starts 
to look suspiciously non-relativistic. Moreover, Olsen encourages us to consider metaethical 
disputation. The debate between utilitarians and deontologists, for example, indicates that 
even academic philosophers (whom, one would hope, are very careful about such things) 
assume the univocal nature of moral terminology. There is no assumed standard here, as the 
argument itself is about standards. Finlay asks us to recall the last time we engaged in moral 
discourse with the likes of Charles Manson, but why insist on such extreme divergence? 
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Address, expectation and disputation evidence is abundantly available, in favour of objective 
prescriptivity. 
The final source of evidence is reactive attitude evidence. This encompasses the 
observation that we blame agents who have erred according to our own moral standards, 
not theirs. This behaviour signifies that you have done something wrong and punishable 
when you subvert my moral standards in a way entirely different to that of subverting my 
standards of etiquette. Thus there appears to be an assumption that moral standards are 
shared and apply equally to anybody. As such, this evidence is aligned with Joyce’s proposal 
that competent users of moral discourse assume that one who acts immorally has failed to 
respond to reasons that are authoritative for her. Furthermore, this implies allegiance to 
strong categorical imperatives. Finlay’s response here is to admit that this blame does imply 
such allegiance, and thus an error theory is called for in the case of ‘second order’ blame 
judgements. However, he claims this would fail to contaminate the semantic truth 
conditions of first order judgements of right and wrong. For these second order judgements 
to contaminate the concept itself, it would have to be the case that without such reactions 
of blame, one could not coherently hold the action to be wrong.  
Nevertheless, there is something intuitive about the necessity of blame. If I believe 
Øing is morally wrong, and you disagree and insist upon Øing, yet I do not blame you for 
your actions, this attitude should lead me to ask some important questions about in what 
sense I judged the action to be morally wrong25. The moral sphere is undeniably one with 
great value placed upon it, and judgements of wrongness tend to go hand in hand with 
judgements of blame. Perhaps in the case of unintentional immoral acts wrongness and 
blame come apart. Nevertheless, in such cases blame is the natural response, and this is 
tempered by whatever mitigating circumstances may apply. Finlay observes that we do not 
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 Note that a sincere relativist could coherently make such a judgement and yet withhold blame. 
However, empirically speaking, these judgements tend to coincide. 
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blame agents for failing to respond to authoritative reasons in general. Thus, 
unresponsiveness to authority is insufficient to explain our blame; there is some other factor 
at play. However, the special nature of moral authority is accepted by both Joyce (through 
strong categorical imperatives) and Finlay (as we care more about the institution than 
happiness). Reactive attitude evidence still supports an objective understanding of moral 
discourse. 
Finlay here has shown that the behavioural evidence indicating that users of moral 
discourse employ an objective conception can be explained given an assumption of 
relativism. While the evidence is better and more coherently explained through an appeal to 
objective prescriptivity, Finlay’s relational interpretation can (for the most part) account for 
these behaviours. Nevertheless, Finlay goes on to argue that even hypothetically assuming 
universal acceptance of objectively prescriptive moral discourse, it is uncharitable to assume 
that this contaminates the truth-conditions of moral claims. In other words, people may 
genuinely be unaware of precisely what their moral assertions and thoughts actually mean. 
Note again, however, that this works both ways: even if the assumption of relativism is 
ubiquitous on a conscious level, if morality is used in ways that imply objective prescriptivity, 
this element may be essential to the concept. In any case, we shall now move on to consider 
Finlay’s positive argument that the error theory is false. 
 
2.4 Absolutism and Meaning 
Thus far, Finlay (2008) has argued defensively that moral thought and behaviour can 
be legitimately interpreted as relativistic. However, Finlay believes that even if, in fact, most 
users of moral terms aver objective morality this would fail to systematically infect the truth 
conditions of the discourse. Thus, for the sake of argument he hypothetically concedes to 
the error theorist that most people understand moral discourse as objectively prescriptive. 
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However, as he agrees that there is no sense to be made of non-institutional categorical 
imperatives, this position necessarily involves attribution of genuine conceptual ignorance 
on a wide scale. The case of ancient absolute motion discourse has already provided a 
convincing example where, instead of attributing widespread conceptual error to a 
discourse in virtue of what people think they’re talking about, we charitably assume them to 
be actually talking about defensible relative motion. Thus we have a paradigmatic case 
where the meaning and truth conditions of sentences are not what the speakers think they 
are. Hence there is space for Finlay to argue that the same applies to moral discourse. 
Consideration of why ancient people espoused an indefensible notion of absolute 
motion may foster sympathy for Finlay’s argument. Whilst there is no sense to be made of 
an object simply moving without some frame of reference, or another object to compare it 
to, it is easy to see why, prima facie, motion judgements might appear to be objective. The 
surface of the earth itself provides a frame of reference so enormous and ever-present that 
judgements which in actuality are relative-to-the-surface-of-the-earth appear to be non-
relative. Thus, one who speaks of (tacitly) relativised motion can confer with a believer in 
absolute motion without either realising their disagreement. Similarly, moral judgements 
made relative to commonly held standards may give the illusion of being objective. 
However, this is simply a chimera caused by abundant convergence in moral ends. Hence, 
what motion and moral judgements have in common is the near-universal constancy of one 
parameter. If the fact that this parameter is merely ‘near’-universal remains unnoticed, its 
indispensability may go unnoticed. Thus we have a reasonable causal story to tell about how 
metaethical reflection and behavioural observation could result in belief in objective values 
whilst in actuality moral judgements are tracking relative values. 
It is essential that the error theorist’s argument, when applied to ancient motion 
discourse, does not find it guilty of systematic error. Thus the error theorist must have some 
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story to tell about the relevant difference between the two discourses. Motion he is happy 
to allow relativistic truth-conditions, and maintain that these were the actual truth-
conditions the whole time, whilst morality remains inextricably tied to objectivity such that a 
relativistic revision simply would not count as moral discourse. In Finlay’s words, “The 
difficult question we cannot avoid here is: how is the (semantic and conceptual) content of 
our language and thought determined?” (2008:22). If somebody’s concept is precisely what 
they think it is, this provides unintuitive results in the motion case. Finlay implies that the 
error theorist’s argument turns on the equivalent thought about morality; that the reflective 
evidence mentioned above is the substantial basis of the argument. However, while there is 
room for the relativist to argue his case despite reflective evidence, the same goes for the 
error theorist. Indeed, Joyce (2001, 2011, 2012) conceives conceptual commitment as 
involving interplay between reflective understanding and function - the ways the discourse is 
used and the behaviours surrounding it. 
Thus, there remains space for the error theorist to drive a wedge between motion 
discourse and moral discourse: if relativistic motion discourse can perform all the functions 
of absolute motion discourse, but relativistic moral discourse cannot perform all the 
functions of objective moral discourse26, a disanalogy appears. However, this is an empirical 
claim which remains undecided, as is the necessity of whichever elements of objective moral 
discourse fail to survive the conceptual revision, both of which shall be discussed in the final 
sections. Nonetheless, the analogy to motion is a useful tool to evaluate the aptness of 
moral error theory. Therefore, the next section involves further comparisons with other 
discourses infected with false presuppositions. Given that the appropriate reaction to 
discovering the infected presupposition appears to vary between discourses, perhaps we 
can convincingly argue for categorising moral discourse as either irreversibly error-laden or 
resurrectable through revision. 
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 Authoritatively censuring Gyges comes to mind here. 
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2.5 Discourses 
Ultimately, both parties to this dispute agree about whether an error theory or 
conceptual revision is appropriate in the four paradigmatic discourses of witchcraft, 
phlogiston, water and motion. Thus, evaluation of the reasoning behind the strong, 
convergent intuitions in these cases provides a useful framework within which to consider 
morality. We shall investigate the rationale behind the categorisation of these four 
discourses, and then examine the nature and function of moral discourse. 
Witchcraft and phlogiston discourses are deemed irrevocably error-laden because of a 
false presupposition. Thus these discourses have been largely abandoned. However, water 
and motion discourses were, once upon a time, also infected with such a presupposition. Yet 
the consensus in these cases is that the flawed presupposition was legitimately extracted 
without altering the concept itself, changing its truth-conditions, or warranting a new label. 
In fact, we insist that the amended discourse is what we were using the whole time. 
Therefore, mere commitment to a false presupposition is not a sufficient condition to 
warrant an error theory. Consequently, we must further investigate the nature and necessity 
of the commitment in order to illuminate what other factors are at play. 
The flawed presupposition in ‘witch discourse’ is the use of magical powers. A woman 
who bears all the other hallmarks of a witch (solitary, black hat, disruptive of the patriarchy 
etc.) but nevertheless lacks magical ability is not a witch. Such is the necessity of magic-use 
to the concept of witchcraft. Thus, the less-than-superstitious individual who denies that 
magic powers exist in the world finds the extension of the term witch to be empty. Hence, 
the need for an error theory. Witch discourse as it stands fails to refer, leaving witch-
assertions systematically false. Furthermore, a modified version of witch discourse which 
abandoned talk of magic appears to not be about witches after all. We deem labelling 
women who use magic to be a non-negotiable use of witch discourse, such that the ‘second 
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best contender’ for the concept is simply not good enough. Thus, if morality’s commitment 
to objectivity is akin to witchcraft’s commitment to magic, the moral error theory is 
vindicated. 
‘Phlogiston’ was a term used to refer to a substance stored in flammable materials 
and released during combustion. Prior to a chemical understanding of the role of oxygen in 
combustion, phlogiston was thought to coherently explain observations such as changes in 
the weight of a burning substance. However, it has been discovered that there simply is no 
such stuff universally to be found in flammable materials and that the observations are best 
explained through understanding the role of oxygen. Thus, the extension of the term 
phlogiston is empty. Furthermore, revision of the concept such that ‘phlogiston’ actually 
refers to oxygen is illegitimate. The property of being stored in flammable materials is 
deemed essential to phlogiston, and oxygen does not share this property. Thus, sensible 
people espouse an error theory about phlogiston, and do not deem oxygen discourse to be a 
resurrected version of phlogiston discourse. Hence, once more, if morality’s commitment to 
objectivity is akin to phlogiston’s definitive commitments, the moral error theory is 
vindicated (Joyce, 2001). 
We shall now move on to discourses which, on the face of it, have been legitimately 
revised. Water, for example, was once thought to be an element. It is now known to be a 
compound. However, when this was discovered, the reaction was not to accuse all prior 
water-claims of being false. Rather, it was surmised that this compound was what we had 
been talking about the whole time. Perhaps the really central, non-negotiable features of 
water discourse involve referring to stuff that is clear, drinkable, falls from the sky, fills the 
oceans etc. Nevertheless, the commitment to water’s elemental nature appears to have 
been rightfully revised. However, why is water discourse charitably altered whilst phlogiston 
gets the uncharitable boot? There are some intuitive answers here. There is something in 
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the nature of water as a macroscopically observable substance which ensures conceptual 
continuity. One can point to a bucket of water and say “that’s the stuff I’m referring to - right 
there!” (Putnam, 1975). When one discovers that the nature of the ‘stuff’ isn’t precisely how 
one thought it was, this doesn’t warrant a new concept and label, for it is clearly the same 
stuff. Hence the disanalogy to phlogiston. Competent phlogiston speakers would have 
pointed to flammable objects and said “it’s the stuff in there that is released during 
combustion” and thus could hardly claim they were speaking of oxygen in the air the whole 
time. 
However, when Finlay and Joyce alight upon the ‘point’ of a discourse as decisive in 
evaluating the legitimacy of a certain revision, they are not referring to the above method of 
pointing to the thing under discussion. Clearly such a methodology fails when discussing the 
nonmaterial concepts of motion and morality27. Rather, Finlay calls the primary intention of 
the discourse to refer its ‘referential point’. In light of this, perhaps motion discourse can be 
understood as primarily intending to refer to the changes in the spatial positioning of objects 
over time. This (entirely plausible) understanding of the central intention of motion talk is 
not undermined by the conceptual revision from absolute to relative motion, as this goal is 
still achieved. In addition, it appears that there are no uses of motion-talk that do not survive 
the conceptual revision28. Thus this revision is valid, allowing the same verbal output and 
use. Finlay interprets Joyce as being committed to claiming that the referential point of 
moral discourse is to refer to objectively prescriptive values. If this is the case, the extension 
of the phrase “X is morally right” remains empty without universally authoritative reasons, 
as was argued in Chapter One. In contrast, we have already seen Finlay argue that the 
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 Arguably this is not the case, as we can still point to cases of motion and moral judgement and say 
that is what we are talking about. 
28
 The intention to describe changes in absolute location may not survive translation, but such use has 
no apparent advantages over the relational equivalent. 
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apparently objective features of moral discourse are better explained by a non-referential 
point, i.e., rhetorical flourish. 
Finlay presents another way of explicating the referential point of a discourse: 
essential application conditions. For example, the term ‘witch’ is appropriate if, and only if 
talking of a woman with supernatural powers. Moreover, the term motion is applicable if, 
and only if an object has changed position over time, relative to some frame of reference. 
However, Finlay goes on to claim that Øing is morally wrong if, and only if, it violates certain 
standards or ends. In contrast, the error theorist will likely maintain that Øing is morally 
wrong if, inter alia, there is an authoritative reason for any given agent to refrain from Øing. 
Unlike the error theorist’s formulation, Finlay’s provides a justifiable framework within 
which to morally denounce an action; in lieu of objective values a metaphysically defensible 
thing to which moral claims could refer are such standards. This is a point Finlay has already 
argued. However, it is central to the error theorist’s case that moral claims are, in fact, not 
referring to something defensible. Finlay is being overly charitable here in assuming that 
people must be referring to the closest instantiated relative of their intention: “Assuming 
there is no genuine absolute motion, or genuine absolute moral properties, the absolutist‘s 
judgements could not be responsive to these fictional properties” (2008:26). 
Alarmingly, this charitable interpretation can be used to defend revision of concepts 
such as witchcraft where an error theory is unanimously accepted. Whilst judgements are 
always in response to some genuinely perceived stimuli, if the agent infers from this stimuli 
a further, non-existent, property, his concept may still be error-ridden. As per Hume’s 
pathetic fallacy, the mind can ‘spread’ itself upon external objects and take what is there as 
evidence for that which is not (Mackie, 1977:42). Hence, Finlay’s charity appears to 
mistakenly vindicate witch discourse. If users of moral and motion discourse could not have 
been talking about the uninstantiated objective properties, charitably witch-talk could not 
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have been referring to uninstantiated magical powers. Rather, the essential application 
condition for witch-hood must be (say) a woman who challenges patriarchal values. Thus, 
counter-intuitively, there are witches! 
However, Finlay believes he can drive a wedge between this parody argument to 
justify witch discourse and his sincere argument to justify moral discourse. In order to 
demonstrate that witch discourse remains indefensible, he points out that even that which 
is necessarily coextensive need not be part of the essential application conditions of a 
concept. In other words, just because every person referred to as a witch happens to also be 
a woman who challenged the patriarchy, this co-extensionality doesn’t mean that that’s 
what witches are. For example, we can imagine a case of a woman who disrupts the 
patriarchy so as to be a witch according to the parody argument, and yet is not, and 
(suspending disbelief about magic) vice versa. Thus the evidence that such women exist 
does not vindicate witch discourse. Finlay’s view in the moral case is that moral judgements 
do not imply sensitivity to objective values - there are none - but what a person takes to be 
evidence of the realisation of such values: his judgements relative to his own moral 
standards. The fact that people take their relational judgements to be evidence of objective 
values will not undermine the validity of the judgement as long as it is the relational 
judgement is the essential application condition. Thus, the error theory uncharitably 
supposes that because people extrapolate objective judgements from their genuine relative 
judgements, the relative judgements themselves are false. 
Nevertheless, Finlay fails to differentiate moral discourse from witch discourse. The 
flaw in the argument to validate witch discourse is that the evidence and its associated 
instantiated property are non-essential to witch-hood. However, it is entirely reasonable for 
the error theorist to insist that the equivalent holds for moral discourse. One can imagine a 
case where “the standard evidence of moral wrongness obtains, but the action (say) is not 
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morally wrong, or of a situation where none of the standard evidence obtains (no apparent 
suffering, no hurtful intentions) but in which the action is wrong nonetheless.” (Joyce, 
2011:12).29 Thus, despite there being (perhaps trivially) some standard against which any 
given moral judgement can be understood, this doesn’t imply that this relational property is 
the essential application condition for a moral judgement. Furthermore, Finlay’s assertion 
that relational judgements are taken as evidence for objective moral truth can be resisted. 
Far more likely is that suffering, harm, and selfish or cruel intentions are taken as direct 
evidence for objective moral wrongness.  
Thus Finlay has failed to expose an asymmetry between witch discourse and moral 
discourse. From the evidence for witches (confessions, testimony, patriarchal challenging 
etc), superstitious medieval people extrapolated the property of witch-hood, which is in fact 
uninstantiated. Perhaps this evidence, in fact, reliably constitutes the instantiated property 
of disrupting the patriarchy, but the witch error theorist has other reasons to think that this 
property will fail to adequately serve as the essential application condition of witch 
discourse. Analogously, whilst the evidence for morality (selfishness, hurtful intentions, 
suffering etc) may reliably constitute various instantiated relational properties, the moral 
error theorist has reasons to think the relational conception inadequate to transparently 
serve as moral discourse. Hence, the charitable argument that we should assume people to 
be referring to whatever instantiated property best fits the evidence fails. 
 
2.6 The Crux of the Argument: Evidence Revisited and Some Unusual Implications 
Insistence that the essential application conditions for moral judgements are 
relational is the crux of Finlay’s (2008) positive argument that the error theory is false. His 
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 Consider, for example, that many view consensual sex between a brother and sister as immoral 
despite a viable absence of suffering, harm or hurtful intentions. Conversely, despite the pain he 
inflicts, I do not morally condemn my dentist. 
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re-evaluation of the evidence was intended as a dispensable prelude to this argument. 
However, in order to resist Finlay’s relational theory, it is incumbent upon the error theorist 
to expand upon her ‘other reasons’ for thinking relativistic moral discourse an inadequate 
contender for morality. Inevitably, this leads us full circle back to an appraisal of the 
evidence. Therefore, let us now reconsider several of the more decisive points previously 
mentioned, beginning with linguistic evidence for objective prescriptivity. 
Finlay writes that if people were genuinely employing an objective conception of 
morality, they would likely be sceptical that relational judgements count as moral. However, 
this is precisely the thought motivated by the case of the Nuremberg judge - that explicitly 
relational judgements do strike the folk as failing to capture something essential to the 
authority of morality. It is difficult to ascertain whether tacitly relativised moral statements 
invoke similar scepticism because we may be entirely unaware of the tacit elements in 
another’s speech - indeed, Finlay would have us believe that these relational elements are 
tacit even in the thoughts of the speaker. The thought experiment revolving around making 
explicit what Finlay believes is tacit was intended to surmount this difficulty. If you agree 
with Joyce’s estimation of the folk’s probable reaction, you will likely be suspicious of 
Finlay’s tacit relativity. Thus, the link between linguistic evidence and objective moral 
discourse is far simpler and more coherent than the relativistic explanation. 
Secondly, observation of moral address, expectation and dispute provides the error 
theorist with further reason to be doubtful of the relational interpretation. Contra Finlay, 
moral judgement and dispute between those with fundamentally different standards is a 
common occurrence, as we have seen argued by Jonas Olson (2010) in section 2.3. Finlay’s 
insistence that our moral discourse is largely continuous with that of a homogenous society 
is further undermined by the increasing prevalence of such debate online, where 
convergence of standards in one’s geographical region is irrelevant. These fundamental 
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disputes are undertaken with a passion that belies the possibility that moral truth is 
equivocal and merely determined by one’s own standards. 
Thirdly, Finlay formulates the difference between weak and strong categorical 
imperatives in terms whether we value the demand more than the happiness of the agent in 
question. This is a defensible position to take, but may have some unusual consequences. 
Imagine that I care very much about the kind of music that people listen to. I will interfere 
(at the expense of people’s happiness) to ensure that they listen to the right music. I will 
punish people for listening to the wrong music. If valuation above happiness is sufficient to 
make values moral, my musical views are moral. Finlay may choose to bite the bullet on this 
and admit that listening to jazz is a moral end for me, and listening to pop is morally wrong. 
This is coherent, but some might find it an unintuitive consequence of Finlay’s theory that 
my musical judgements are moral, as they are aesthetic, and unrelated to harm30. 
Alternatively, Finlay might argue that whilst outweighing considerations of happiness is 
necessary for moral value, there are further conditions required. In this case a convincing 
story needs to be told about the other requisite factors. Consider, for example, that in 
Western culture judgements about what to wear are primarily aesthetic, whereas in Muslim 
culture decisions about clothing are heavily morally loaded. These considerations do not 
weigh decisively, but there are challenges with conceiving the peculiar nature of moral value 
this way. 
Fourthly, there is a crucial disanalogy between revision of absolute motion and 
revision of objective morality. In all likelihood, no competent user of motion talk who is 
aware of the options of a relational or absolute understanding of the discourse, and the 
reasons why the absolute form is defective will insist upon defending absolute motion 
judgements. There is nothing to be achieved by absolute motion judgements which cannot 
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 Jonothan Haidt (1992) has notably argued that the content of moral judgements and the domains 
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be achieved by relational motion judgements, and the arguments for their insensibility are 
convincing. This debate is long settled. However, amongst the folk (and even metaethicists) 
who are aware of the options of relational or objective moral judgements, there are many 
who insist upon asserting non-institutional categorical imperatives, who insist that relational 
judgements are too weak, that they cannot do the same jobs and express the same 
meaning. The difference in attitude between those aware of the two forms of each 
discourse should encourage us to question the strength of the analogy here. 
In addition to these reconsiderations, Jonas Olson has recently argued that there are 
other reasons to think Finlay’s relativistic project fails to capture something essential to 
moral discourse. Olson (2010) points out that Finlay’s system of relativising moral claims 
according to standards necessarily applies to all moral claims, including claims about 
standards themselves. For example, to assert that utilitarianism is the correct metaethical 
theory is a moral claim. However, such metaethical assertions can only be relativised to 
themselves; they are their own standard. This reasoning indicates that every claim about a 
moral standard is actually a tautology, such as ‘in order to maximise overall utility, one must 
maximise overall utility’. While Finlay (2009) is prepared to bite the bullet on this, it remains 
a surprising result which fits incongruously with observed behaviours relating to moral 
standards. Olson identifies several strange implications of thinking of moral standards as 
tautologies. Remarkably, there is no correct or incorrect metaethical theory. Agents making 
fundamental claims about moral discourse do not intend to utter tautologies, and engage in 
sincere debate about which standard is correct, which is bizarre behaviour if all contenders 
are trivially correct. 
Olson goes on to point out that competent users of moral discourse intend their 
fundamental moral claims to be informative, sometimes controversial, and not obviously 
true. To discover, for example, that the morally correct thing to do is that which maximises 
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overall utility might change one’s behaviour, beliefs and judgements. How a tautology could 
perform these belief- and action-guiding roles is quite mysterious. Finlay (2009) argues that 
assertions of moral standards function as ‘conversation stoppers’ which demand and 
motivate action, rather than conveying semantic content. Whilst such assertions likely 
sometimes perform these tasks, agents also take one another to be conveying content, and 
are even prepared to review their moral standards. As agents do not use fundamental moral 
claims as though they are tautologies, it is most unlikely that this is in actuality what they 
mean. Olson thus concludes that attributing widespread false beliefs (and absurd 
behaviours) relating to the nature of fundamental moral discourse is a less charitable 
understanding of moral discourse than the objectively prescriptive (though error-ridden) 
conception favoured by Joyce and Mackie. Significantly, however, whilst this makes most 
people’s metaethical views and behaviour look strange, the conclusion that there is no 
uniquely correct moral standard is quite compatible with Finlay’s relational theory. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that Finlay’s theory comfortably tolerates a consequence that, if 
commonly accepted, would drastically alter fundamental moral discourse indicates that his 
understanding of moral discourse fails to fails to capture the prevailing view in this case. 
In the light of this scepticism about relational moral judgements, the error theorist will 
likely maintain that the essential application conditions for morality revolve around reasons 
that are universally authoritative. Hence, the impasse between the moral relativist and error 
theorist. In the case of Gyges the error theorist claims we have no business demanding he 
refrain from his debauchery unless we can provide a valid reason to refrain. However, Finlay 
disagrees, claiming “I think we should deny that the ordinary concept of wrongness entails 
any such thing” (2008:29). The absence of a valid reason for Gyges to refrain is simply 
explicable for the moral relativist. The demand that he refrain is made relative to certain 
standards and ends of the speaker which Gyges does not share – end of story. Thus, morality 
construed this way can make sense of Gyges’ indifference, whilst licensing moral 
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condemnation of his behaviour. However, this conception cannot explain the intuition that 
Gyges is breaking his own rules, captured in Joyce’s discussion of strong categorical 
imperatives: “because our moral framework is categorical we can carry on legitimately 
saying ‘Gyges, you ought not do that!’ But if our utterances are merely a verbal output that 
has been validated by an institution of our own creation, it all begins to sound rather shrill” 
(2011:5). 
Finlay’s explication of the error in the error theory vitally turns upon his claim that the 
essential application conditions for Øing to be morally wrong or right are judgements 
relative to some standard. The error theorist, in contrast, maintains that objectivity is 
essential to morality, and that such a conception makes better sense of observed behaviours 
surrounding the discourse. This is justified, as the objective interpretation involves less self-
deception and a more transparent relationship between what people think and say and 
what they mean, as well as licensing the stronger meaning desired by moral speakers. Thus 
objective moral discourse is a superior candidate for the concept of morality. However, 
Finlay’s tacit understanding of relational judgements is logically coherent, and is certainly 
not disproved by virtue of less parsimoniously explaining the evidence. Furthermore, it 
allows for a metaphysically defensible understanding moral discourse, which may count in 
its favour.  
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Conclusion: An Underdetermined Dispute 
Chapter One follows Richard Joyce (2001) in concluding that objective moral 
prescriptions require universally valid reasons. As such reasons are not to be found, 
objective moral claims are systematically false. Chapter Two considers Stephen Finlay’s 
(2008) contention that moral discourse is best understood as relational, and the subsequent 
debate with Joyce (2011) about whether moral discourse is actually in the business of 
providing objective prescriptions. 
I contend that this dispute will likely remain underdetermined insofar as the thoughts 
and behaviours of competent users of moral discourse will not settle questions about the 
commitments of the discourse itself. Indeed, the substantial role that tacit content plays in 
Finlay’s interpretation of the discourse severely limits the possibility of empirically resolving 
these questions. Furthermore, it is possible that the relativistic and error theoretical 
metaethical stances are genuinely equally valid in a more significant sense than mere 
empirical underdetermination: moral discourse may actually have no privileged meaning. 
This notion of ‘metaethical pluralism’ is espoused by Joyce in his forthcoming paper of 
the same name31. Joyce takes his point of departure from David Lewis’ (1989) discussion of 
moral value. Lewis argues that “values are those things which we are disposed, under 
certain idealized conditions, to desire to desire” (Joyce, 2012:2). However, he finds it 
unsettling that according to this conception, moral values might have been other than they 
are commonly considered to be, and considers demanding those values which we are 
necessarily disposed to desire to desire. This move soothes worries about the contingency of 
value and provides a more powerful moral conception, but at the price of making the set of 
moral values empty, as there is likely nothing which we are necessarily disposed to desire to 
                                                          
31
 While Joyce writes regarding the dichotomy between the moral naturalist and moral sceptic, the 
notion of pluralism remains applicable to this dispute. 
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desire. Lewis concludes that while the moral conception that includes necessity best 
captures what it would take to perfectly deserve the name moral value, “loosely speaking, 
the name may go to a claimant that deserves it imperfectly” (1989:136-7). 
Lewis infers that what one makes of this situation is primarily a matter of 
temperament. One can fret about the shocking discovery that there are no moral values, or 
accept that the nature of value is not how one thought it was. Lewis and Finlay prefer the 
conservative adjustment of the nature of value, whilst Joyce takes the former route. 
However, assuming good (but inconclusive) arguments can be given for both sides as we 
have seen in this dispute, perhaps nobody is, in fact, right. Lewis says “When it comes to 
deserving a name, there’s better and worse but who’s to say how good is good enough?” 
(1989:137). 
Joyce has proposed two ways to consider this question, though neither is decisive. In 
The Myth of Morality (2001), we imagined an anthropologist who discovers a culture that 
utilises a certain discourse that shares many characteristics with our ‘morality’. Thus the 
question of whether a discourse is a good enough deserver for a term becomes one of 
translation: would we translate said discourse to morality in English, or would it be a mere 
schmorality (Joyce, 2007)32? However there is no definite answer to this question, which is 
still loaded with difficulties, not least of which is determining who ‘we’ are33. Subsequently, 
Joyce has appealed to how we use the discourse in question. If discourse Q is used in ten 
different ways, and the imperfect claimant Q* can only be used in nine of these ways, then 
Joyce argues that Q* is an inadequate claimant, as it cannot “pull its pragmatic weight in 
everyday life” (Joyce, 2012:5). Joyce argues that this way of conceiving the issue may bypass 
considerations of temperament: if Finlay’s relational values can play all the practical roles of 
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 A similar thought experiment is proposed in West (2010). 
33
 Note that this was not intended to be a usable decision procedure, but merely a way of conceiving 
the task at hand. 
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objective moral prescriptions then his imperfect claimant is vindicated, if it cannot then it is 
inadequate. However, the uncertainty is here reiterated anew. Perhaps Q* needn’t fulfil 
every role Q is used for, but merely enough roles. However, who’s to say how many is 
enough, or which are necessary? 
The primary role of moral discourse that Finlay’s relational theory cannot fulfil is that 
of asserting the existence of reasons that are universally authoritative, thus ensuring that 
moral prescriptions provide authoritative reasons to the judgee. Error theorists and 
objective moral realists both believe that this is a paradigmatic use of morality such that a 
revision which would not pull its weight in this area will be inadequate. This is because 
advocates of these theories believe that this is what moral imperatives mean, and thus to 
assert such reasons is a necessary function, or essential application condition. However, as 
Finlay’s theory reinterprets the semantic meaning of moral claims and the truth conditions 
thereof, he is entitled to insist that his understanding of moral discourse can pull its weight 
in terms of performing the functions required of morality. 
The significant way these theories come apart can once again be illustrated through 
Gyges. Undoubtedly it is a central use of moral imperatives to censure one who rampantly 
rapes and pillages. However, both theories licence this censure. They only differ insofar as 
an objective moral prescription necessarily would authoritatively censure Gyges, such that 
he would actually have reason to stop, whereas a relational moral imperative merely tells 
Gyges that according to a standard endorsed by the speaker he has a reason to stop. If you 
are inclined to think that a moral imperative requires the power of the former conception, 
and agree with the arguments of Chapter One towards the systematic falsity of objective 
moral prescriptions, this will lead you to embrace the moral error theory. However, if you 
are convinced of the adequacy of Finlay’s interpretation of the meaning of moral claims, you 
might aver moral relativism. 
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If, however, one remains indifferent about the requisite strength of the imperative 
against Gyges (or remains indecisive for other reasons), there is a final appeal that can be 
made to the pragmatic benefits of espousing either theory. It might appear that pragmatic 
considerations would support the relativistic reinterpretation, as this allows us to maintain 
moral discourse. However, even if you would prefer a world that includes moral talk, 
thought and dispute, the options of moral fictionalism (Joyce, 2001, 2005), and non-
cognitivism (Carnap, 1935) remain equally viable contenders, each exchanging the 
metaphysical baggage of realism or relativism for a new set of challenges. Furthermore, 
some philosophers such as Garner (2007) and Hinckfuss (1987) have controversially argued 
that, pragmatically speaking, the benefits of abolishing moral talk and speech outweigh 
those of keeping them. Discussion of these positions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
perhaps such pragmatic analysis is the way forward for metaethical thought34. 
  
                                                          
34
 I am indebted to many people for their assistance and support during the writing of this thesis. 
Particular thanks to Luke Russell, Kristie Miller, Gina Tedeschi and Alice, Claire, Kate and David 
Norton. 
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